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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine the possibility of collusion in the regulation of a monopolistic market when a benevolent principal delegates to a regulatory agency two tasks: the supervision of the …rm's (two-type) costs and the negotiation with the …rm over a pricing policy. In this new setting we investigate the classic questions: which regulatory policy should we expect in such a situation? What are the characteristics of the collusive gains? Which is the best response to collusion? What are the determinants of this response? This paper is a …rst attempt to derive some preliminary results within this general setting.
We consider a standard model of a three-tier regulatory hierarchy, where the political principal (Congress) directs the activities of a supervisor (the regulatory agency), which in turn oversees the operation of a monopoly (the regulated …rm). We innovate the usual approach assuming that the principal delegates to the supervisor a general negotiation with the monopolist on the regulatory policy. The reason for this generalization is that usually regulation does not boil down to a passive enforcement of a policy, but actually involves a negotiation between the regulator and the …rm. In other words, regulatory arrangements are generally the result of a give-and-take process rather than of a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er, since the possibility of pre-committing to a speci…c o¤er is actually unrealistic. Another important issue to analyse would be the bargaining process between the political principal and the regulatory agency, but we limit the scope of this paper within the negotiation between the agency and the …rm.
The literature on regulation has long ago recognized the relevance of introducing general bargaining processes in the interaction between regulator and …rm. For example, Kahn (1971) had already observed that often public utilities represent cases of bilateral monopolies, while Spulber (1989) proposed regulatory models dealing with bargaining processes. Similarly, Scarpa's (1989 Scarpa's ( , 1994 work represents a preliminary attempt to model this aspect of regulatory situations. Finally, Armstrong and Sappington in their survey on optimal regulation have recently recognized that the standard formulation, which ignores negotiations between the regulator and the …rm, ‹ ‹ generally is adopted for technical convenience rather than for realism›› (2007, p. 1564) . Also empirical studies support this idea. Among others, Brotman (1987) reported that negotiations with private …rms are a normal way to decide on industry regulation.
In our model a benevolent Congress (interested in the consumer surplus)
delegates to a regulatory agency 1 two activities: a supervisory job and a bargaining task. 2 Therefore, the regulator is not only a mere conduit of information about the …rm's costs, but it carries out the additional task of negotiating a regulatory settlement with the …rm. Congress delegates the full contracting authority to the regulator since it lacks …nancial resources, skills or expertise to run this task. 3 As usual in collusion models, the agency cannot be trusted to perfectly enforce Congress's intent because it may be self-interested and thus have an incentive to collude with the …rm by manipulating its information to Congress in return of a side transfer from the …rm. 4 However, di¤erently from standard models, side contracting between the agency and the …rm is considered as a bargaining process parallel to the negotiations over the regulatory mechanism. The two bargaining stages are modelled using the Nash solution concept (1950, 1953) , which we argue is the most e¤ective way to deal with our view.
Our analysis shows how standard results are altered by these two bargaining processes. This does not mean at all that the approach in this paper contradicts the classic one. Our setup turns out to be a generalization of the standard model, which represents the speci…c case where all the bargaining power is allocated to the agency.
In absence of collusion (Section 3), the regulatory mechanism agreed by the agency and the …rm maximizes the total gains from trade, which are shared between players according to their bargaining power. However, the introduction of negotiation between the regulator and the monopoly induces a radical change in the collusion stage. While the ine¢ cient …rm as usual does not have any interest in cost manipulation, we …nd that the e¢ cient …rm has an incentive to collude only if it is su¢ ciently weak in the bargaining process. Interestingly, collusion pays o¤ when the …rm's revenue from a higher price more than compensates the lower subsidization. Since the latter reduces 1 We take Tirole's (1986) assumption of unique regulator, which may be justi…ed either by a cost of duplication of the regulatory function or by collusive behaviour between regulators. 2 As in La¤ont and Tirole (1990), we assume that regulatory institutions result from a constitution drafted by some benevolent "founding fathers" or "social planners", which may be identi…ed with Congress. The latter delegates some activities to a public decision maker, which is represented by a regulatory agency. 3 It seems natural to assume that a legislative assembly does not have the right skills to contract directly with the …rm. Of course, this does not mean that full delegation is optimal. The characterization of the conditions under which this is the case is a very stimulating topic, but it is outside the scope of this paper. See on this issue the contribution of Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003) . 4 Tirole stresses the importance of reciprocity in the side contracting and states that ‹ ‹ one-sided favors call for reciprocated ones›› (1986, p. 185).
with the agency's bargaining power, this can be the case only if the agency is strong enough. If the latter could make a standard take-it-or-leave-it o¤er, the total gains of collusion would be maximized. This implies that bargaining mitigates the incentive to collude.
In the second part of the paper (Section 4), we focus on the optimal organizational responses to the possibility of collusion. The well-known Tirole's (1986) equivalence principle predicts that, under some conditions, deterring collusion through appropriate incentives is always optimal in equilibrium. In our setting, incompleteness of contracts arising from institutional constraints prevents Congress from devising a mechanism which perfectly discriminates between the agency's types, and thus the equivalence principle does not apply. 5 We assume that Congress can use one of the following three instruments: an incentive reward to the agency, the shutdown of the ine¢ cient …rm (of course both intended to deter collusion), or tolerating collusion tout court. As long as the probability of facing the e¢ cient …rm is low enough and thus the shutdown policy is not convenient, Congress …nds it optimal to tolerate collusion in equilibrium if the cost of the incentive reward which induces the agency not to collude outweighs the expected consumer loss from collusion. In other terms, collusion is optimal when tolerating this possibility is less costly than deterring it. We explore this condition and show that the players'bargaining powers crucially drive the optimal response to collusion. Interestingly, we …nd that preventing collusion is optimal if the agency's bargaining power is below a certain threshold. A stronger agency improves Congress's incentives to tolerate collusion in equilibrium. The idea is that such an agency can exact a higher bribe from the …rm and thus the incentive reward for not colluding is more expensive. In other terms, a high bargaining power of the agency in the negotiation process can make collusion too costly to …ght.
On the other hand, when the probability of facing the e¢ cient …rm is su¢ ciently high, the shutdown policy may become a valuable option. In this case, Congress never …nds it optimal to tolerate collusion and prefers to …ght it either by giving the agency an incentive reward or by shutting down the ine¢ cient …rm. The latter policy outperforms the former when the agency is strong enough in the bargaining process. This occurs since the expected bene…t of allowing the ine¢ cient …rm to produce is lower than the incentive reward for not colluding.
Clearly these results suggest that the players'bargaining powers in regulatory relationships should deserve careful consideration, since they crucially drive the potential for collusion. The arbitrary limitation to model with all 5 See Tirole (1992), Kofman and Lawarrée (1996) . 4 the bargaining power allocated to the regulatory agency may neglect interesting institutional regulatory mechanisms as endogenous best responses to the possibility of collusion.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the basic structures of the model. Section 3 considers the case where collusion is freely possible: in Subsection 3.1 we derive the regulatory policy with a benevolent agency, while Subsection 3.2 analyses the case of a nonbenevolent agency. In Section 4 we characterize the optimal institutional responses to collusion. Finally, Section 5 is devoted to concluding remarks. Congress is a benevolent principal concerned with consumer surplus only. It hires a regulator which supervises the …rm's unknown marginal costs and bargains with the …rm over the regulatory mechanism. Full delegation of contracting authority arises from Congress's lack of time, skills or resources to run this task. Congress's problem is to o¤er a delegation contract that considers both roles of the regulatory agency and provides the compensation T CS 0 for the supervision and the negotiation over a regulatory policy. The consumers buy a quantity q (p) for the good and pay a two-part tari¤, characterized by a unit price p and a …xed amount S. Consumer surplus is equal to the bene…t from the marketplace net of the aggregate …xed charges S 6 minus the transfer to the agency T CS , collected through distortionary taxes which impose a shadow cost 0, 7 i.e.
CS p; S; T
For the sake of convenience, consumer demand is supposed to depend linearly on price. Thus, without loss of generality we consider the following simple expression
The …xed payment S may be thought of as apportioned among consumers in such a manner that no consumer is excluded from purchasing the good. 7 Our results do not crucially depend on the presence of a (strictly) positive shadow cost of public funds, which is considered only for the sake of completeness. This implies that the assumption of non-distortionary …xed charges is (qualitatively) inconsequential. and consumer surplus reduces to
The …rm
The …rm's cost function C (:) is a¢ ne:
where K denotes the …xed costs which are assumed to be common knowledge, while the marginal cost c i , with i 2 fL; Hg, is private information of the …rm. The two cost parameters c L and c H , with c c H c L > 0, are drawn with (common knowledge) probabilities and (1 ) 2 (0; 1), respectively. Moreover, we assume that c H < 1 to ensure that production is always …rst-best e¢ cient.
Therefore the c i -type …rm's pro…t function is
The regulatory agency
The regulator has a twofold role: supervising the …rm's unknown marginal costs and bargaining with the …rm over the regulatory mechanism. There are two types of agency: benevolent and self-interested. The benevolent regulator, which is drawn with (common knowledge) probability 2 (0; 1), always reports truthfully to Congress the signal received from the surpervisory technology (see below). Moreover, it settles for a transfer T , needed to …nance its activity, equal to its reservation value e T (normalized to zero) and perfectly internalizes Congress's interests during the bargaining process with the …rm. Therefore, the utility function of a benevolent agency is
A self-interested regulator, which occurs with complementary probability (1 ), has an incentive to forge the informative signal and collude with the …rm (see below). Moreover, it internalizes only partly Congress's interests and aims to receive a transfer T e T . The utility function of a nonbenevolent agency is given by
where 2 0; , with < 1, is a parameter that captures the regulator's degree of internalization of Congress's objectives. If = 0, the agency is only interested in its private transfer. 8 A higher implies that it gives more weight to Congress's aim.
The supervisory technology is characterized by perfect monitoring, so that the signal the agency receives is always informative about the …rm's marginal costs. However, the signal is supposed to be soft information, and thus it can be manipulated. 9 This means that the regulator may lie and convey a report r 2 fc L ; c H g di¤erent from the actual c i by altering the result of its audit activity. Manipulating information is the agency's degree of discretion: it can announce a wrong cost parameter since this report is never veri…able.
A benevolent agency always reports r = c i to Congress, while a selfinterested agency has an incentive to declare r 6 = c i colluding with the …rm. 10 
Timing
The timing of the regulatory game is as follows.
1. Nature draws a type -benevolent or nonbenevolent -for the agency with probability and (1 ) respectively, and privately informs the agency. Nature also draws a type for the …rm c i 2 fc L ; c H g, with respective probabilities and (1 ), and privately informs the …rm.
2. Congress o¤ers to the agency a contract which determines a transfer T CS (r) 0 conditional on the report r and delegates the negotiations with the …rm about a regulatory mechanism.
3. The contract is signed or rejected by the agency. 8 This is the classic case of perfectly nonbenevolent agency, see La¤ont and Tirole (1991) . 9 See La¤ont and Rochet (1997) for an analysis of the di¤erence between hard information and soft information models. 10 It is usually assumed in the literature that the …rm observes the agency's signal. This can be the case if before signing the collusive agreement the agency must disclose to the …rm the signal it has received. We do not need such an assumption because the signal is always informative and this is common knowledge, hence the …rm knows the agency's signal. However, in line with the literature we need to assume that the agency cannot forge the signal against the …rm's will. In other terms, we require that cost manipulation occur when it is pro…table for both partners. We can imagine that the …rm is able to prove before Congress its actual costs. This assumption rules out the possibility of blackmail by the agency in our setting. Khalil and Lawarrée (1995) underline the importance for future research of studying this phenomenon. 5. Negotiations between the agency and the …rm take place on a regulatory mechanism fp; Sg.
If it is benevolent, the agency reports r = c i to Congress.
If it is dishonest, the agency has an incentive to collude with the …rm and manipulate its information, i.e. r 2 fc L ; c H g 6 = c i . In this case, they bargain over a side transfer T F (r) as a reward for the agency's report. 6 . Contracts are executed and the regulatory policy is implemented. Figure 1 summarizes the basic structures of the model.
Use of the Nash bargaining solution
The novelty of this paper is that the agency negotiates with the …rm both on a regulatory mechanism fp; Sg and on the split in collusion gains when the agency is dishonest. Therefore we need to consider a model for both these negotiation processes.
As well known, the outcome of a bargaining game is very sensitive to all the details of the negotiation process as well as to the delay costs of the two players, i.e. to all the bargaining protocols. For example, in the simple one-shot simultaneous o¤er protocol, any outcome is a possible equilibrium even using strong re…nement concepts. 12 A crucial point in the speci…cation of a bargaining game is whether the players are assumed to commit to their actions, thus providing a speci…c extensive form. Obviously, in many settings it is di¢ cult to provide a reliable speci…cation of all the possible moves, of their sequence and of the information available to the players during the play.
Therefore, instead of describing the speci…c bargaining procedure in full details, i.e. a speci…c and therefore arbitrary extensive form, we choose to characterize the outcome by a more general approach. The driving idea of this paper is to use the cooperative asymmetric Nash model (1950, 1953) . We believe there are at least …ve good reasons to make such a modelling choice.
1. Its generality allows to avoid the speci…cation of a particular extensive form structure.
2. The Nash solution is e¢ cient so that our results do not depend on the unexploited gains from trade in the speci…c bargaining procedures which can be considered. This means that our approach might underestimate the transaction costs between the colluding parties, but we capture this aspect with a shadow cost of side transfers (see Section 3).
3. The uniqueness of the Nash solution implies that the principal can anticipate the outcome of bargaining to determine its optimal reaction, which is crucial for this kind of collusion models.
4. As we will show, this solution leads to easy calculations but also to interesting and plausible results.
5. As Spulber (1989, ch. 2) emphasizes, a crucial feature of regulatory hearing processes is the direct interaction between players which may result in a consensus, so that the bargaining game can be modelled as a cooperative game.
Even though there are alternative cooperative concepts such as the KalaiSmorodinsky solution, for our purposes the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is probably the most convincing and e¤ective. 13 3. Regulation when collusion is tolerated
The benevolent agency
With probability a benevolent agency is drawn, which completely internalizes Congress's interest in consumer surplus. Hence, Congress would o¤er a reward T CS = e T 0 to the agency, independently of its report r. As long as the regulator is benevolent, it transmits its information truthfully and there is no threat of collusion.
The regulatory policy negotiated between a benevolent agency and a c itype …rm solves
where the parameters and (1 ) 2 (0; 1) are respectively the agency's and the …rm's bargaining power. Notice that this is independent of the benevolence of the agency. A low does not mean regulatory capture arising from collusion, but it denotes the agency's weakness in the bargaining process, which may stem from limited resources in terms of skills and expertise to assert its own interests and …nd the best compromise with the …rm.
The nonnegativity constraints (PC A ) and (PC F ) represent the agency's and …rm's participation constraints. A benevolent agency is interested in consumer surplus, which must be nonnegative in order to induce the purchase of the good. Similarly, the …rm cannot accept to produce by making losses. Hence, also the disagreement payo¤s are zero for both bargaining parties.
Substituting (2) and (3), as de…ned by (1), into (5) yields
The Nash solution can be justi…ed using di¤erent extensive form structures. See among others Binmore and Dasgupta (1987) , Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) , Rubinstein (1982) . (6) s:t: (P C A ), (P C F ):
After replacing the choice variable S with from (2) into (6), the maximization problem may be rewritten as
Ignoring the constraints, 14 from the …rst-order condition for p it is immediate to …nd that the price agreed by the regulated …rm and a benevolent agency is equal to
As the Nash bargaining process is e¢ cient, the negotiated regulatory policy clearly implements the marginal cost pricing, independently of bargaining powers. The agency and the …rm do not have any incentive to distort price from marginal cost, since both prefer to maximize the total gains from trade. Not surprisingly, we will see that the …rm tries to extract these gains through the subsidy S: 15 From the …rst-order condition for we …nd
i.e. the pro…t arising from negotiations is a share (1 ) of the total gains from trade T GT (c i ) for marginal costs c i :
16 Clearly, the stronger the agency, the smaller the pro…t that the …rm can obtain from the regulatory arrangement. Note that, even though the agency is benevolent and does not collude, the …rm gets a pro…t which is strictly greater than its reservation value, without any consequence on the allocative e¢ ciency.
Substituting (7) and (8) into (2) yields
i.e. the subsidy covers the …xed costs K and assigns to the …rm a share (1 ) of the total gains from trade T GT (c i ) : Obviously, an increase in the agency's bargaining power reduces the …rm's subsidy: very weak agency ( ! 0) allows the …rm to get a high subsidy, while if all the bargaining power is allocated to the agency ( ! 1) as in standard principal-agent models, the …rm is hardly able to cover its …xed costs through subsidy (S (c i ) ! K) and receives no pro…t.
The consumer surplus is given by
i.e. it is a share of the total gains from trade: The positive relation between and CS (c i ) shows that clearly consumers bene…t from a strong benevolent regulator.
We summarize the main results in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 If the agency is benevolent, then the negotiated regulatory mechanism maximizes total gains from trade, and in particular applies marginal cost pricing, i.e. p (c i ) = c i gives the …rm a subsidy S (c i ) = (1 ) T GT (c i ) + K, which is decreasing in the agency's bargaining power .
The self-interested agency
A nonbenevolent agency, which is drawn with probability (1 ), is interested in consumer surplus and in the private transfer T . This income may come either from consumers, through the taxes they pay, or from the …rm, which may give a bribe to the agency for the manipulation of the informative signal.
We assume that Congress tolerates the possibility of collusion. Hence, Congress continues to o¤er a constant reward T CS = e T to the agency, independently of its report r, so that a nonbenevolent regulator has an incentive to collude with the …rm.
A self-interested agency opens the possibility of collusion, since the …rm may have a stake in the agency's report.
Proposition 1
Proof. Using (7), (8) and (9), a report r = c L while the …rm's true cost is c H yields an extra pro…t equal to
The c L -type …rm's extra gain (c H ; c L ) from forging the agency's report can be written as
which is positive if and only if 2 (e ; 1), where e is de…ned in Proposition 1.
While as usual the ine¢ cient …rm is never interested in cost manipulation, the e¢ cient …rm …nds it pro…table to collude only if it is su¢ ciently weak, i.e. 2 (e ; 1). Note from (11) that collusion pays o¤ only if the extra gain from a higher market price c (1 c H ) more than compensates the subsidy loss (1 ) (T GT (c L ) T GT (c H )). Interestingly, the stronger the agency in the bargaining process, the higher the …rm's extra pro…t from pure informational advantage with respect to Congress. This occurs because the agency's bargaining power reduces the subsidy loss from cost manipulation. In fact, we know from (9) that a weaker …rm can extract a lower subsidization. Since the extra gain from a higher market price is independent of the bargaining power, the stake in collusion increases with a stronger agency. If the latter could make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er ( ! 1) the total gains of collusion would be maximized. This means that the bargaining process mitigates the …rm's incentives to collude.
In line with the main literature, the side contract between the …rm (with 2 (e ; 1)) and the self-interested regulator is supposed to be enforceable, even though it is illegal. 17 According to Stigler's (1971) , collusion is driven by two crucial factors: the stake in collusion and the organization costs. In our setting, the stake in collusion is given by the extra pro…t (c H ; c L ) in (11) that the c L -type …rm can obtain if its private information is altered before Congress. As Tirole (1992) emphasizes, collusion is likely to be a serious issue only if information can be manipulated.
The …rm's costs of organization are represented by transfer costs, 18 which are related to the deadweight loss associated with the side transfer of income from the …rm to the regulator. 19 Following La¤ont and Tirole (1991), we capture this ine¢ ciency by introducing an exogenous shadow cost of side transfers 0. The idea is that a monetary equivalent of one dollar received by the agency costs (1 + ) dollars to the …rm. This parameter determines the transaction technology between the …rm and the agency. If ! +1, the transaction technology is so ine¢ cient that no coalition forms. Otherwise, the transaction technology makes collusion pro…table. If = 0 then there is no deadweight loss from side contracting.
The regulatory arrangement arising from collusive negotiations allows the c L -type …rm to keep its informational advantage over Congress (r = c H ) even though the agency is informed about the …rm's costs. The side contract speci…es a covert transfer T F (r) 0, which is paid by the …rm to the agency only if r = c H and costs (1 + )T F (r) to the …rm. We assume that in case of disagreement about the side contract the agency and the …rm continue to bargain and can reach the no-collusion outcome V 20 Thus the solution to this bargaining problem arises from the maximization of the Nash product of the two parties' gains in utility over the no-side-contract outcome. Formally,
(PC F ) 18 Furthermore, the …rm incurs mobilization costs to collect information and intervene in speci…c regulatory issues. These costs are ignored in our setting. 19 A monetary bribe exposes the parties to the possibility of legal sanctions. Alternatively, the agency's sta¤ values nonmonetary side transfers (for entertainment, jobs after the tenure in the agency,...) less than the monetary expenses incurred by the …rm. 20 We follow Tirole's (1986) idea that each party can guarantee itself the no-side-contract outcome.
The last constraint (C C ) indicates the pro…t of the c L -type …rm under collusion. The rationale is the following. When the collusive agency lies and reports r = c H , we know from (11) that the …rm's pro…t from signal manipulation is the sum of the …rst two addends of (C C ). This represents the gross earning of the …rm from collusion. The …rm spends a part of this gain, equal to (1 + ) T F , to pay a side transfer T F to the agency. We have assumed that, in case of disagreement about the side contract, the agency and the …rm continue to negotiate over the regulatory mechanism. In this case, we would be in the same setting as in Subsection 3.1 except for the parameter . The agency would not receive any bribe (T F = 0) and would reveal the truth to Congress (r = c L ), which could save the extrapro…t to the …rm ( = 0). Hence, the agency's no-collusion utility is equal to the consumer surplus CS (c L ) weighted by (i.e. (10)). The …rm's no-collusion pro…t is given by (c L ) (i.e. (8)). As from (10) r = c H implies that Congress expects CS (c H ), we replace (2) and (4), as de…ned by (1), into the maximization problem in (12) , which becomes
s:t:
Substituting (C C ) into (13) and ignoring for the moment the other constraints yields after some manipulations
Notice from (14) that the agency's gain V C N B over the no-collusion outcome, represented by the …rst factor in the Nash product, is the side transfer from the …rm minus the consumer loss weighted by . The …rm's gain in collusion C , captured by the second factor of the Nash product, is the difference between the total stake in collusion and the expense (1 + ) T F to bribe the agency. After some manipulations the …rst-order condition for T F can be written as
From (15) in equilibrium the side transfer is given by
We emphasize now a result of some relevance. We …nd that b e (de…ned in Proposition 1) since the nonbenevolent agency's degree of consumer surplus internalization reduces its willingness to collude. Only if the agency is completely dishonest ( = 0) the incentives to collude of both players perfectly align, i.e. b = e . Notice that b < 1 as long as <
, i.e. for low enough. Otherwise, a dishonest agency will not collude since no bribe can compensate its disutility from lying, and then there is no di¤erence between the two types of agency. Since we are interested in the possibility of collusion, we focus hereafter our attention on the case <
. A straightforward consequence of our discussion is that the side transfer T F in (16) increases in . The greater the weight the nonbenevolent agency attaches to consumer surplus, the higher the amount of side transfer that it requires to manipulate its information. Hence, can be thought of as the inverse of the level of corruptibility of the regulator. An increase in implies more disutility from lying (in terms of consumer surplus loss) and makes the agency more costly to bribe.
The bribe that the agency can extort from the …rm is increasing in its bargaining power. If ! 0, the regulator does not collect anything (T F ! 0) since it is too weak. If ! 1, all the bargaining power is allocated to the agency and the side transfer tends to
which is just the maximum extra pro…t that the …rm can obtain from the manipulation of evidence discounted by the shadow cost of side transfers. Note that the side transfer in (18) approximates the take-it-or-leave-it call for a bribe taken by the agency which is commonly assumed in collusion models. 21 Not surprisingly, the side transfer to the regulator is decreasing in the transaction costs of collusion. If = 0, the side contracting is fully e¢ -cient and the …rm can a¤ord to pay a high bribe. If ! +1, transaction technology is so ine¢ cient that collusion is infeasible (T F ! 0). Using (16), we derive after some computations the extra gains from collusion of the agency and the …rm. They are given by
and 21 See, among others, La¤ont (2000, ch. 2). 22 The functions depicted in Notice that the parameter introduces a second source of ine¢ ciency in the collusion process. In fact, a part of the net collusion gains 1+ directly …nances the share of the consumer loss internalized by the agency and constitutes a mere waste of resources in the bribing game. An increase in the agency's bargaining power reduces the fraction of the total pie appropriated by the …rm, since the agency requires a greater side transfer. Nevertheless, the …rm gets an increasing extra rent from collusion over some range. Hence, the bene…t for the …rm from an increase in the total stake in collusion induced by outweighs the cost of a reduced bargaining power. When the agency's bargaining power is su¢ ciently high, the trade-o¤ becomes detrimental to the …rm, whose gain from collusion decreases.
The institutional responses to collusion
So far we have supposed that Congress tolerates tout court the possibility of collusion. In this section we characterize the institutional responses that Congress should devise to give consumers the highest (expected) surplus. We consider three alternative options:
Note that when choosing option 1 Congress is supposed to design an incentive scheme which applies to both types of the regulator. This assumption is quite common in literature and can be justi…ed by institutional settings that allow compensations contingent to agency's report only. As Tirole (1992) suggests, the impossibility of discriminating between the agency's types may be thought of as Congress's uncertainty about a binary transaction technology of collusion. Indeed, as shown in Section 4 if ! +1 the side contracting is so ine¢ cient to make collusion infeasible, i.e. we obtain the same outcome as with a benevolent agency. For lower values of , collusion becomes pro…table, i.e. we …nd the same outcome as with a nonbenevolent agency.
Baiman et al. (1991) rule out the screening assumption by modelling the option to collude as a random event which is not an inherent characteristic of a subject but it is associated with the environment. In Kofman and Lawarrée's (1996) model, the principal is not able to discriminate between the di¤erent types of auditors because the latter have the same utility function but di¤erent strategy spaces. 24 Following La¤ont (2000, ch. 2), we suppose that incompleteness of contracts arising from institutional constraints prevents Congress from devising an incentive compatible mechanism which induces the self-selection of regulators according to their type. In other words, Congress cannot distinguish between the regulator's types because legal arrangements prohibit from making the reward of the agency's sta¤ contingent on some variables that reveal the regulator's type. 25 Collusion literature has shown that removing the screening condition implies that Tirole's equivalence principle does not apply. Starting from this observation, we …rst derive the conditions which drive the institutional responses to collusion. Then, we show how the players' bargaining powers crucially a¤ect these conditions.
If Congress decides to prevent collusion through an incentive reward to the agency (option 1 ), the expected consumer surplus is equal to
In order to get the no-collusion outcome and the associated expected consumer surplus, Congress has to design a bunching mechanism. This scheme gives any type of agency the minimum reward to deter collusion
in (19) . The reward is weighted by the probability that the …rm is e¢ -cient, since only in this case collusion may emerge (see Proposition 1), and it is paid by consumers through possibly distortionary taxes which involve a social cost . If Congress wants to …ght collusion through the shutdown of the ine¢ cient …rm (option 2 ), the expected consumer surplus is given by
This policy rules out the threat of collusion, as the c L -type …rm's interest in cost manipulation vanishes. However, this occurs at the cost of forgoing production when the …rm is ine¢ cient.
If Congress tolerates collusion (option 3 ), the expected consumer surplus amounts to
Congress expects to receive the consumer surplus CS (c H ) arising with an ine¢ cient …rm plus the extra gain in consumer surplus if the agency is benevolent and the …rm is e¢ cient, which occurs with probability .
When designing the optimal response to collusion, Congress compares costs and bene…ts of any option. We start by comparing the strategy of deterring the collusion through an incentive reward (option 1 ) with that of tolerating it cout court (option 3 ). Clearly, the latter outperforms the former if and only if the cost incurred to induce the agency not to collude outweighs the expected bene…t of deterring collusion. This condition is then formally expounded in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Congress prefers to tolerate collusion rather than deter it through an incentive payment if and only if the cost of rewarding the agency for not colluding exceeds the consumer loss from collusion. That is, E CS C
E CS
I if and only if
where
Proof. Compare (20) and (22) . As stressed before, the incentive reward V C N B on the left-hand side of (23) costs (1 + ) V C N B to consumers, since taxes entail a deadweight loss. The expected consumer loss from collusion CS C on the right-hand side of (23), which represents the bene…t of preventing collusion, is weighted by (1 ) , because only the self-interested agency has an incentive to collude. More importantly, from (10) and (11) the di¤erence between CS C and is after some manipulations
Expression (24) shows that the consumer loss from collusion o¤sets the total stake in collusion. While the impact of side contracting on …rm's subsidization constitutes a mere transfer of resources between consumers and …rm, the extra gain the …rm gets from a higher price is lower than the corresponding consumer loss. In fact, the result in (24) stems from the allocative ine¢ ciency due to the price distortion above marginal costs. This implies that collusion does not reduce to a zero-sum game in which the amount of resources extorted from consumers just forms the total pie which can be shared between collusive partners, but it shrinks the total gains from trade and then creates a further distortion in the e¢ cient allocation of resources.
Let us consider now the impact of on condition (23) . As increases, the righ-hand side decreases. Hence, a raise in the probability of drawing a benevolent agency relaxes condition (23) and then allowing collusion is more attractive. The rationale for this result is obvious. Collusion literature has emphasized that if the probability of an honest regulator is su¢ ciently high, costly measures to eliminate collusion may become unnecessary and the optimal contract may allow collusion in equilibrium.
In this framework, we examine the impact of the agency's bargaining power on condition (23) . Notice that V C N B and CS C are both increasing in . A trade-o¤ emerges between deterring and allowing collusion. On one hand, a stronger agency ( goes up) can extort a higher bribe from the …rm. Tolerating collusion becomes more attractive since this allows to save the incentive payment to the agency. On the other hand, the agency's bargaining power increases the consumer loss from collusion and then it makes deterring this threat more desirable. From this trade-o¤ we get the following Corollary of Lemma 2.
, where b is de…ned in Proposition 2. Then, if 2 (b ; ) Congress prefers to deter collusion through an incentive reward rather than tolerate it. If 2 [ ; 1) allowing collusion is more desirable.
Proof. Substitute (10) and (19) into (23) .
Allowing collusion can be preferred if the interval [ ; 1) is nonempty, which occurs if and only
where the bracketed expression is positive. This is clearly the case when the probability of drawing a nonbenevolent agency is low enough. Of course, collusion not is desirable per se, since consumers would be better o¤ if side transfers were infeasible, but it can be allowed when it is too costly to …ght. Notice that the parameter crucially a¤ects the width of the interval (b ; ) where preventing collusion is preferable. A higher makes this option more attractive. A lower level of corruptibility of the agency ( goes up) increases the desirability of deterring collusion, because the agency internalizes more the surplus loss incurred by consumers and asks for a lower incentive reward ( V C N B in (19) decreases). Hence, the agency's interests align with those of Congress, by making collusion less expensive to …ght. The same e¤ect emerges when the shadow cost increases as side contracting is more ine¢ cient and then easier to prevent.
We have so far neglected the possibility of shutdown. It is well known in the literature that Congress may …nd it optimal to close up production when facing an ine¢ cient …rm. 26 Comparing the strategy of incentivizing the agency not to collude (option 1 ) with the shutdown policy (option 2 ) yields the following result.
Lemma 3 Congress prefers to …ght collusion through the shutdown of the ine¢ cient …rm rather than through an incentive payment if and only if the cost of rewarding the agency for not colluding outweighs the loss in consumer surplus from shutdown. That is, E CS S
Proof. Compare (20) and (21) . The shutdown policy has the bene…cal e¤ect of saving the incentive reward to the agency but imposes the cost of closing up the production of the ine¢ cient …rm.
We immediately obtain the following result, which represents a Corollary of Lemma 3.
) Congress prefers to deter collusion through an incentive reward rather than shut down the ine¢ cient …rm. If 2 [ ; 1) shutdown is more desirable.
Proof. Substitute (10) and (19) into (25) .
We know from (10) and (19) that both CS (c H ) and V C N B are increasing in . Corollary 2 reveals which e¤ect prevails in equilibrium. With a strong agency, i.e. 2 [ ; 1), the expected bene…t of allowing the ine¢ cient …rm to produce is lower than the incentive reward for not colluding, and then the shutdown is preferable. Notice that the interval [ ; 1) is increasing in . A high probability of facing the e¢ cient …rm raises the scope for closing the ine¢ cient …rm's production, which creates a low consumer surplus in expected terms. If ! 1 the shutdown policy is clearly always preferable to paying an incentive reward to the agency (b ! ), since Congress incurs no expected costs by excluding the ine¢ cient …rm.
Comparing the shutdown policy (option 2 ) with the strategy of allowing collusion (option 3 ) yields the following result.
Lemma 4 Congress prefers to shut down the ine¢ cient …rm rather than tolerate collusion if the probability of facing the e¢ cient …rm is su¢ ciently high. That is, E CS
S

E CS
C if and only if 2 [e ; 1), where
Proof. Compare (21) and (22) using (10) . The shutdown policy is obviously a valuable option only if the …rm is su¢ ciently likely to be e¢ cient.
We are now in a position to summarize our main results.
Proposition 3 With 2 (0; e ) the optimal response to collusion exhibits the following features if 2 (b ; ) collusion is deterred through an incentive payment to the agency if 2 [ ; 1) collusion is tolerated tout court, and Congress never chooses to close up production of the ine¢ cient …rm. With 2 [e ; 1) collusion is deterred if 2 (b ; ) through an incentive payment to the agency if 2 [ ; 1) through the shutdown of the ine¢ cient …rm, and tolerating collusion is never optimal. When 2 (0; b ] collusion is never attractive. Proposition 3 implies that preventing collusion with an incentive scheme is a desirable strategy independently of the ex ante distribution of …rm's types, as long as the agency is su¢ ciently weak. On the other hand, Congress views the shutdown policy and the tolerance of collusion as mutually exclusive alternatives. The latter is a valuable option only if the high probability of having an ine¢ cient …rm, i.e. 2 (0; e ), makes the former too costly.
The result in Proposition 3 suggests that policy makers should seriously care about some important elements of regulatory relationships like players' bargaining powers in order to evaluate the potential for collusion and the optimal responses to this threat.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined a monopolistic market, where the regulatory mechanism is not a take-or-leave-it o¤er but the outcome of a bargaining process between the regulatory agency and the regulated …rm. A benevolent Congress delegates to an agency, which may be either honest or dishonest, the audit of the …rm's unknown marginal costs. To this end, the agency adopts a supervision technology. Furthermore, it carries out the additional task of negotiating with the …rm a regulatory mechanism.
Even though it has been developed in a quite simple model, our analysis has shown how the bargaining process a¤ects the standard results, which turn out to be a speci…c case of our more general approach. In particular we have focused on the e¤ects of players' bargaining power on equilibrium values. The regulatory mechanism agreed by the benevolent agency and the …rm maximizes the total gains from trade which are shared between the two players. The introduction of a negotiation between the regulator and the monopoly induces a radical change in the collusion stage when the agency is dishonest. We have showed that the e¢ cient …rm …nds it pro…table to collude only if the agency's bargaining power is high enough. Moreover, the total gains of collusion are now lower than those the two partners would appropriate if the agency could make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er.
In the second part of the paper, we have investigated the optimal organizational responses to the possibility of collusion, in absence of discrimination between agency's types. We have showed that the players'bargaining powers crucially a¤ect the optimal response to collusion. In particular, we have found that preventing collusion through an incentive reward to the agency is optimal if the agency's bargaining power is low enough, independently of the ex ante distribution of …rm's types. With a low probability of the e¢ cient …rm, a stronger agency improves Congress's incentives to tolerate collusion in equilibrium as this can be too costly to …ght. Otherwise, the shutdown of the ine¢ cient …rm is the best option. This result has implications of some relevance for the optimal design of regulatory agencies.
We believe that our simple generalization provides useful insights on the role of the bargaining power in institutions or in organizations. Of course, this is just a simple step towards more realistic and complex analysis of the negotiation processes within a hierarchy structure.
Our model may be extended in a variety of directions. The supervisory technology may be modi…ed in order to consider the possibility of imperfect monitoring, which implies that the signal received by the agency may be wrong or uninformative. This would allow to study the bargaining process between the agency and the …rm under asymmetric information. Another possibility is to extend the model by introducing the agency's e¤ort to audit, since in practice the regulator can a¤ect the functioning of the supervisory technology and moral hazard turns out to be an important issue.
